Don't bet on it! Wagering as a measure of awareness in decision making under uncertainty by Konstantinidis, E & Shanks, DR
Running head: AWARENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 1
Don’t Bet on it! Wagering as a Measure of Awareness in Decision Making under Uncertainty
Emmanouil Konstantinidis and David R. Shanks
University College London
Author Note
Emmanouil Konstantinidis and David R. Shanks, Division of Psychology and
Language Sciences, University College London, London, England.
This research was supported by a UCL Graduate School Fellowship to Emmanouil
Konstantinidis.
We thank Maarten Speekenbrink for his helpful comments on the manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Emmanouil Konstantinidis,
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, 26 Bedford
Way, London WC1H 0AP, England. E-mail: emmanouil.konstantinidis.09@ucl.ac.uk
AWARENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 2
Abstract
Can our decisions be guided by unconscious or implicit influences? According to the somatic
marker hypothesis, emotion-based signals can guide our decisions in uncertain environments
outside awareness. Post-decision wagering, in which participants make wagers on the
outcomes of their decisions, has been recently proposed as an objective and sensitive measure
of conscious content. In 5 experiments we employed variations of a classic decision-making
assessment, the Iowa Gambling Task, in combination with wagering in order to investigate
the role played by unconscious influences. We examined the validity of post-decision
wagering by comparing it with alternative measures of conscious knowledge, specifically
confidence ratings and quantitative questions. Consistent with a putative role for unconscious
influences, in Experiments 2 and 3 we observed a lag between choice accuracy and the onset
of advantageous wagering. However, the lag was eliminated by a change in the wagering
payoff matrix (Experiment 2) and by a switch from a binary wager response to either a binary
or a 4-point confidence response (Experiment 3), and wagering underestimated awareness
compared to explicit quantitative questions (Experiments 1 & 4). Our results demonstrate the
insensitivity of post-decision wagering as a direct measure of conscious knowledge and
challenge the claim that implicit processes influence decision-making under uncertainty.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task, unconscious influences, post-decision wagering,
awareness, subjective measures.
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How do people make decisions and adjust their behavior in uncertain environments,
and what types of knowledge control their choices? In recent years several theories have been
proposed which deviate from normative models and expected utility theory, focusing more on
affective and emotional processes that support decision-making under uncertainty (e.g.,
Dolan, 2002; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, &
Welch, 2001; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Schwarz, 2000). This work has drawn attention to
the impact of affect by pointing out that automatic and rapid emotional reactions may serve
as input to the decision-making process.
The somatic marker hypothesis and the Iowa Gambling Task
One popular account of the role of affect in reasoning and decision-making is the
somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) proposed by Damasio (1994, 1996). Initially, the SMH
was developed to explain deficits in patients with certain kinds of prefrontal brain damage
(ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC) who exhibit severe decision-making impairments
in social and personal domains while their cognitive and problem solving abilities remain
largely unimpaired (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Saver & Damasio, 1991).
Such patients also have difficulties in expressing emotional and affective information. The
SMH proposes that these deficits are connected and that decision-making is regulated by
neural biasing signals arising from emotion processing (see Bechara, 2004; Bechara &
Damasio, 2005; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006, for reviews). These signals can be
marked as either positive or negative and are linked directly to bodily states. When a negative
somatic marker is associated with a possible response option, it produces an avoidance
reaction; on the other hand, a positive somatic marker indicates that the response option is
beneficial. In situations of uncertainty, these somatic markers can influence behavior by
marking response alternatives with an emotional signal, thus providing information useful for
guiding the decision process (Damasio, 1994; but see Davis, Love, & Maddox, 2009). Hence,
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the inability of VMPFC patients to integrate and process emotional information leads to
disadvantageous decision-making which can be described as risky, prone to short-term
rewards and insensitive to loss and long-term consequences (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, &
Anderson, 1994).
A major assumption regarding somatic markers is that they operate not only
consciously, when someone has accessible knowledge about the possible outcomes of a
choice, but also unconsciously (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). Specifically, in situations of uncertainty, somatic markers can
guide individuals to make advantageous decisions or avoid disadvantageous ones even when
they are not explicitly aware of the quality or value of those decisions. In order to test the
SMH empirically, Damasio and colleagues developed a gambling task (the Iowa Gambling
Task, IGT) which attempts to simulate real-life decision-making in a laboratory setting in the
way it employs uncertainty, reward, and punishment (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999).
The present research was undertaken to assess the fundamental theoretical idea,
famously advocated and defended by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) that unconscious thoughts or
signals can influence decision-making. Although we focus on one particular experimental
task (the IGT) and one specific conception of the role of unconscious signals (the SMH), it is
important to emphasize that research on the IGT provides a significant fraction of the
research on the wider topic of implicit influences on decision-making. Indeed in a recent
critical review, Newell and Shanks (2014) identified only 2 other sub-fields (multiple-cue
probability learning, and research on the deliberation-without-attention effect) in which the
same level of careful assessment of this proposal has been conducted, and concluded from
their wide-ranging review that the case is far from proven. Put differently, any weakness in
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the evidence arising from studies employing the IGT would significantly undermine the more
general claim that unconscious thoughts play a prominent role in choice behavior.
The IGT is one of the most popular and frequently used paradigms in decision-
making under uncertainty and has become a standard tool for assessing decision-making
deficits in a variety of clinical populations (Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, &
Wagenmakers, 2013). It is a typical experience-based task where the decision-maker chooses
repeatedly from a number of options without having any prior knowledge about the
magnitude and distribution of the outcomes. The original structure of the task consists of 4
decks of cards (labeled A-D) from which 100 cards with different monetary payoffs are
chosen without replacement. Participants are given $2000 as a loan and are instructed to pick
one card at a time from any deck they choose. They must learn that turning each card carries
an immediate reward: Selecting a card from the first two decks (A and B) yields $100 every
trial, whereas selecting from the other two decks (C and D) yields $50. Unpredictably, the
turning of some cards also carries a penalty which is large in the high reward decks A and B
and small in the low reward decks C and D. Sampling from decks A and B (bad or
disadvantageous decks) leads to an overall loss (a net loss of -$25 per card), whereas playing
from decks C and D (good or advantageous decks) leads to an overall gain (a net gain of
+$25 per card). Another feature of the task is that the probability of losses varies from deck to
deck. In a selection sequence of 10 trials from deck A, the loss of $1250 is distributed over 5
cards (loss probability 0.5; punishments from $150 to $350). In deck B the punishment of
$1250 occurs once, with the selection of one card (loss probability 0.1). A similar pattern of
losses is reflected in the other two decks. Specifically, in deck C the $250 loss is divided
across 5 cards (punishments from $25 to $75) whereas in deck D, it occurs only once
(Bechara et al., 1994).
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The IGT assesses decision making under uncertainty (or ambiguity), in the sense that
at the outset of the task participants are ignorant of the probabilities of gains and losses (risks)
associated with each deck. Experimental and neuroscience studies (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Lee, 2013) have yielded considerable insight into the basic mechanisms of
decision making under risk (where the probabilities are known a priori, as in studies of
description-based decision-making). Recently, research on decision-making under
uncertainty has provided insightful evidence about how people behave when the probabilities
and associated payoffs have to be learned by repeated sampling (i.e., experience-based
decision-making) and has identified significant behavioral differences between decisions
based on description and experience (the description-experience 'gap', see Erev & Barron,
2005; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In fact the IGT may be
best conceptualized as a hybrid of the two, in the sense that repeated choices permit the
payoff probabilities to be learned (Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007). Recent
work has suggested that the brain systems engaged in decision-making under risk and
uncertainty may be largely overlapping (Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010).
Findings supporting the hypothesized role of somatic markers in decision-making
come from several studies employing the IGT with VMPFC patients and normal controls
whose electrodermal responses were measured via skin conductance responses (SCRs) as an
index of emotional arousal or somatic markers (e.g., Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara,
2003; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). It
has been argued that the VMPFC region involved in the processing of emotion controls the
modulation and generation of SCRs (Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000). SCRs
generated during the task were divided into three categories: Reward SCRs generated after
selection of cards which yielded a reward, punishment SCRs after cards which carried a
punishment, and anticipatory SCRs (aSCRs) prior to any deck selection. Both patients and
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controls showed reward and punishment SCRs. However, after a number of card selections,
the control group started to generate aSCRs which were larger in anticipation of selections
from the bad decks, while the lesion group did not develop these responses. The main
conclusion was that failure to activate the somatic marker system leads to impaired task
performance, consistent with the idea that somatic markers play an important role in guiding
decision-making in normal individuals (see Damasio, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2003). Following
this, Carter and Smith Pasqualini (2004) reported that the stronger the aSCRs prior to
disadvantageous choices, the greater the success of participants in acquiring the advantageous
strategy in the IGT (see also Guillaume et al., 2009; Oya et al., 2005).
How cognitively penetrable is the IGT?
A major issue concerning the IGT is at what stage in the task participants learn the
advantageous strategy and whether this knowledge is assisted by implicit or unconscious
biasing signals. In a highly influential study, Bechara et al. (1997) proposed that normal
participants decide advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy, meaning that
they start to select cards from the good decks before they have conscious knowledge that
those decks are the best. Tranel, Bechara, and Damasio (1999) suggested that conscious
knowledge alone is insufficient to explain advantageous performance in the IGT. Similarly,
Peters and Slovic (2000) used a variation of the IGT and concluded that affective processes
have an important role in decision-making and can influence choice independently of
conscious knowledge.
Measures of conscious knowledge in the IGT
To assess participants’ knowledge about the task, Bechara et al. (1997) halted
participants after 20 trials and then after every further 10 trials and asked them “Tell me all
you know about what is going in the game” and “Tell me how you feel about the game”.
Analysis of their responses revealed that participants went through three periods before they
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reached the “conceptual” period where they had a firm and explicit understanding of the
properties of each deck. In the “hunch” period participants developed a preference for the
good over the bad decks and generated aSCRs prior to selecting from the bad decks but their
verbal responses showed no confidence about this preference. The importance of Bechara et
al.’s claim about the existence of unconscious signals comes from the “pre-hunch” period in
which participants had experienced some losses but without any conscious insights about
what was going on in the task (in the earliest period, “pre-punishment”, participants showed a
preference for the bad decks before experiencing any losses from them). The key finding was
that aSCRs and card selections from the good decks began in the pre-hunch period (though in
fact this was not statistically significant) and were sustained throughout the task indicating
that implicit learning was taking place prior to explicit understanding of the reward and
punishment schedule for each deck. In other words, Bechara et al. claimed that participants
behave advantageously even when their knowledge is still at the pre-hunch period, when their
explicit conceptualization of which were the good and bad decks had not yet developed.
This proposal about the role of unconscious influences in guiding behavior in the IGT
has been extensively criticized on the basis of weaknesses in the method that Bechara and
colleagues used to assess their participants’ knowledge. For example, many studies in the
implicit learning literature have shown that such broad questions as the ones they employed
often fail to identify all of the conscious knowledge that participants have acquired in
performing a task (Shanks, 2005; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Several criteria that a reliable
measure of awareness must satisfy have been elaborated, such as reliability, relevance,
immediacy, and sensitivity (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Newell & Shanks, 2014). Bechara et
al.’s assessment (1997) does not fulfill any of these criteria. For instance, it is unlikely to be
either sensitive (as participants may adopt a very conservative reporting criterion) or relevant
(as participants may concentrate on reporting task features unrelated to deck value). For that
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reason, Maia and McClelland (2004) developed a more sensitive test of awareness in the
form of a structured quantitative questionnaire. After the first 20 card selections and then
after every further 10 card selections, Maia and McClelland asked their participants a number
of questions in which they had to give ratings on a scale from -10 to +10 concerning how
good or bad they thought each deck was and to provide justifications for their ratings. They
also asked participants specific questions about the expected gains and losses associated with
each deck and their level of confidence that they were aware of the best strategy to win in the
game. Also, participants were asked to report which deck they would choose if they could
only select cards from one of the decks for the rest of the game.
Using this assessment, Maia and McClelland (2004) found that advantageous
performance on the task was accompanied by accurate reports about the values of the decks.
They concluded there is no support for the claims of Bechara et al. (1997) that unconscious
biases guide behavior before conscious knowledge is acquired or that the activation of
unconscious somatic markers is necessary in order to perform advantageously. Instead, deck
selections in the IGT are driven by conscious knowledge about the decks and by conscious
strategies about how to maximize payoffs. Also, the early awareness of the goodness and
badness of each deck that Maia and McClelland observed (after only 20 trials) means that
aSCRs obtained on the IGT could have been generated by conscious knowledge of the deck
payoffs rather than being causally involved in the decision making process (Dunn et al.,
2006). Another interpretation of the high aSCRs before disadvantageous card selections lies
in the reward and punishment schedule. Because the amount of money both gained and lost
for each card is on average much greater for bad than for good decks, participants’ aSCRs
may have been higher for bad decks because they were expecting an immediate higher-
magnitude reward (Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002). The possibility that
unconscious somatic biases are activated during the task cannot be ruled out, but as Maia and
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McClelland pointed out, “there is no need to invoke such biases to explain participants’
behavior: verbal reports reflect consciously accessible knowledge of the advantageous
strategy more reliably and at least as early as behavior itself” (p. 16079).
Another divergence between the two studies concerns the trial at which the onset of
awareness occurred. Bechara et al. (1997) reported that participants started to have some
conscious knowledge on trial 50 on average (range 30-60) and the same finding was reported
by Maia and McClelland (2004) in their replication using Bechara et al.’s assessment.
However, using the more detailed quantitative questions described above, Maia and
McClelland’s participants were classified as aware of the difference between good and bad
decks even after the first 20 trials. This divergence suggests that the measure employed by
Maia and McClelland is considerably more sensitive in revealing the conscious knowledge
that participants acquired.
Similar findings have been reported from other studies which employed quantitative
and focused questions (e.g., Bowman, Evans, & Turnbull, 2005; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, &
Turnbull, 2007; Evans, Bowman, & Turnbull, 2005; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Bowman et al.
(2005) assessed participants’ knowledge by asking them to rate each deck in terms of how
good or bad they felt it was. After the first 20 trials, participants showed substantial
awareness of which decks were good and bad and their awareness discriminated the good
from bad decks better than their behavioral performance did, replicating the results of Maia
and McClelland (2004).
Post-decision wagering
In order to avoid some of the complications associated with verbal reports, Persaud,
McLeod, and Cowey (2007) developed a novel non-verbal method of assessing awareness in
the IGT in which participants are required to place wagers after their card selections. Persaud
et al. characterized post-decision wagering as an objective and direct measure of awareness.
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When a participant maximizes her earnings through advantageous wagering (that is, bets high
after a correct decision and low after an incorrect one), this is taken to indicate conscious
knowledge about the task.
In Persaud et al.’s (2007) variation of the IGT, participants were asked to make a
wager of £10 or £20 after each deck selection. The amount of reward, or of reward and
punishment, was expressed as a multiple of the chosen wager. The reward and punishment
schedule of each deck was modified in order to be dependent on wagering. Selections from
decks A and B (bad decks) yielded a win of two times the wager whereas selections from
decks C and D (good decks) returned the amount of the wager. The frequency of losses was
identical to the structure of the original IGT whereas the magnitude was adjusted to reflect
the ratio of losses to wins of the original IGT. The net outcome of choosing from the bad
decks was a loss of 5 times the average wager per 10 cards, and the net outcome from the
good decks was a gain of 5 times the average wager per 10 cards. Thus, the net outcome was
either a win of £75 (good decks) or a loss of £75 (bad decks) [((20 + 10) / 2) × 5] per 10 cards
if participants randomly allocated their wagers (50% high, 50% low).
Persaud et al. (2007) investigated the influence of different modes of questioning in
parallel with deck selections and wagering in three different groups. The first group was
asked only to place a wager, whereas the second and third groups were also given the verbal
assessments used by Bechara et al. (1997) and Maia and McClelland (2004), respectively.
Persaud et al. measured on which trial good deck selection and advantageous wagering began
and conjectured that if a significant difference (lag) between these measures emerged, with
deck selections revealing a preference for good decks before advantageous wagering
emerged, this would indicate an unconscious influence on decision making. In the first group,
good deck selection began on trial 40 and advantageous wagering on trial 70. The difference
between these was statistically significant and indicated that participants showed a preference
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for the good decks while failing to maximize their winnings by advantageous wagering. The
same pattern was observed in the second group in which participants were asked the open-
ended questions used by Bechara et al. Good deck selection started on trial 46 and
advantageous wagering on trial 76. However, using the quantitative questions of Maia and
McClelland, there was an effect on wagering even though performance on the task in terms of
deck selections was similar to the other two groups. Specifically, good selection began on
trial 36 and advantageous wagering at almost the same time (trial 38).
Persaud et al. (2007) interpreted these findings as demonstrating that the assessment
method can affect the knowledge that participants acquire during the IGT. While
performance (selecting the good decks) was unaffected, participants gained earlier insight (as
measured by wagering) about the reward and punishment schedule and the quality of each
deck when they were concurrently asked more specific quantitative questions about the
nature of the game. Indeed the onset of advantageous wagering was brought forward by over
30 trials in the group that was periodically asked the Maia and McClelland quantitative
questions. Persaud et al. proposed that Maia and McClelland’s (2004) assessment method
was intrusive and altered participants’ awareness and that performance on the IGT is
primarily affected by unconscious processes which are masked if the measure of awareness
itself makes participants aware of the nature of the task (see also Koch & Preuschoff, 2007;
Reimann & Bechara, 2010; Wang, Krajbich, Adolphs, & Tsuchiya, 2012).
Persaud et al. (2007) stated that “Simply asking people might seem a straightforward
method, but they may deny awareness if the question asked does not relate to the method they
think they used to reach the decision” (p. 257) which is a reasonable critique of the open-
ended questions used by Bechara et al. (1997). However, an intriguing issue that arises from
their own results is to examine the trial on which participants first demonstrated awareness of
the reward and punishment schedule. When no questions were asked or when participants’
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awareness was assessed by open-ended questions, advantageous wagering – putatively a
measure of awareness – appeared quite late in the task (not before trial 70). This pattern,
which Persaud et al. did no comment on, is strikingly inconsistent with the studies described
above which showed that higher awareness ratings were given for the good decks even in the
first 20 trials. Although some minor property of the way they implemented the task or of their
participants might have induced this late sensitivity, it raises the important possibility that
post-decision wagering is not as sensitive and direct as Persaud et al. claimed.
Criticisms of post-decision wagering
Although post-decision wagering seems a well-grounded method, it has been the
subject of a number of methodological criticisms. First of all, the dichotomous nature of post-
decision wagering seems to presuppose that conscious experience is dichotomous as well (see
Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsoy, 2006; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, &
Cleeremans, 2010). If conscious experience does not have this binary character then it is
difficult to ascertain when a participant is aware, as a low wager may not imply absence of
awareness (Wierzchon, Asanowicz, Paulewicz, & Cleeremans, 2012).
Another issue is the influence of loss aversion in wagering strategies. According to
prospect theory, humans have an asymmetric utility function; for example, the prospect of
losing $5 has greater subjective magnitude than that of winning the same amount of money
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Schurger & Sher, 2008). Empirical studies have shown that
losses are evaluated roughly twice as much as gains (e.g., De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs,
2010; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007).
Behavioral measures of awareness, such as post-decision wagering, require participants to
place a criterion on their subjective evidence scale about whether to wager high or low.
Hence, any response criterion may be modulated or affected by cognitive biases such as loss
aversion (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). Specifically, the individual
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could place a low wager in order to minimize loss even though she has some confidence in
her decision. In an artificial grammar study, Dienes and Seth (2010) employed two different
measures of conscious knowledge, confidence ratings and post-decision wagering. They
found that wagering was affected by loss aversion and that confidence ratings comprised a
more sensitive measure of awareness.
A final issue regarding post-decision wagering is that the optimal strategy for
wagering in the experiments of Persaud et al. (2007) is, paradoxically, always to wager high,
as this strategy will give the same outcome if good vs. bad deck discrimination is at chance
but will increase winnings if it is greater than chance. In this sense wagering high can be said
to be a weakly dominant strategy with Persaud et al.’s payoff matrix as it is either no worse
than wagering low, or better. A rational participant would always wager high, regardless of
her knowledge about the task (Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2008). (Note that for the sake
of simplicity we will continue to define and measure advantageous wagering as wagering
high on good deck selections and low on bad ones). This leads to the question: “How can a
failure of a subject to wager optimally be a measure of lack of awareness of the sensory
evidence when the optimal strategy is independent of that evidence?” (Clifford et al., 2008, p.
56). Clifford et al. proposed a solution to this by modifying the original payoff matrix used by
Persaud et al. (Table 1).
System 1 vs. System 2, Conscious vs. Unconscious, Intuition vs. Deliberation
The question whether behavior and decision-making can be influenced by
unconscious “gut feelings” and “intuitive processes” has attracted considerable attention
within psychological science. The different formulations of this distinction (e.g., System 1 vs.
System 2, intuition vs. deliberation) have different functional attributes and procedural
features but also share some common characteristics. For example, System 1 is unconscious,
associative, effortless, and fast whereas System 2 is conscious, deliberative, and rule-
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governed (see Kahneman, 2011). An important feature of System 1 is its reliance on affective
information or signals (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Hence somatic
markers (or emotional/affective biasing signals) can be seen as manifestations of System 1,
guiding people to make advantageous decisions in situations of uncertainty and outside of
awareness. Thus the main assumptions of the SMH fit readily within this dichotomy of
reasoning systems.
In the present work, we examine the claim of different reasoning and learning systems
in the context of one of the most frequently used decision-making tasks, the IGT. In
particular, we investigate whether people have relevant conscious insight when they make
advantageous decisions. The present experiments focus on the outcome of the process that
leads participants to make good decisions and ask whether this outcome is consciously
accessible or not.
Overview
Developing valid and sensitive non-verbal methods of assessing awareness is an
important goal and post-decision wagering holds much promise. It has been used, for
example, to study decision-making and awareness in nonhumans (Kornell, Son, & Terrace,
2007; Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2011, 2012) and children (e.g., Miller, Brownell, & Zukier,
1977; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001) where traditional confidence scales can
be difficult to use. Also, it has been extensively employed as a probe of conscious knowledge
in several areas of experimental psychology such as perceptual decision-making and
subliminal perception (e.g., Koriat, 2011; Nieuwenhuis & de Kleijn, 2011; Persaud et al.,
2011; Persaud & McLeod, 2008; Sandberg, Bibby, Timmermans, Cleeremans, & Overgaard,
2011; Sandberg et al., 2010; Weiss & Scharlau, 2011; Zizlsperger, Sauvigny, & Haarmeier,
2012), implicit learning (e.g., Haider, Eichler, & Lange, 2011; Mealor & Dienes, 2012;
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Wierzchon et al., 2012) and value-based decision-making (e.g., Lueddeke & Higham, 2011;
Wang et al., 2012).
The five experiments reported here permit a more detailed evaluation of post-decision
wagering as a measure of awareness in decision-making under uncertainty. The current work
uses the IGT (and variations) as the main decision-making paradigm for three reasons: first,
the IGT is probably the most frequently used task to assess decision-making deficits. As such,
our work will shed more light into the processes that drive performance on the task and help
identify key elements of decision-making under uncertainty, namely whether participants
have conscious knowledge when they make advantageous decisions. Second, the IGT is a
typical experience-based task, indicating that this work could potentially benefit a large area
within decision-making. Third, the IGT has been the main assessment to test and develop the
SMH, a popular account of the processes relating reasoning, decision-making, and affect.
This work has two major aims. We compare wagering with confidence ratings and
participants’ quantitative numerical reports, mindful of the possibility that quantitative
questioning might reflexively influence the development of awareness of the deck values. We
also compare different versions of wagering which are identical in all respects except with
regard to the payoff matrix, so as to determine whether the results obtained by Persaud et al.
(2007) were due to an idiosyncrasy of the matrix they employed (such as the weak
dominance noted above) and to ask whether the evidence they obtained for unconscious
influences in decision-making is robust.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 included two groups in an attempt to reproduce the key findings
reported by Persaud et al. (2007). Both groups performed the IGT and made post-decision
wagers. In the questionnaire group participants were also regularly asked a subset of Maia
and McClelland’s (2004) quantitative questions, while those in the control group were not.
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Comparisons between these groups allow a number of issues to be addressed: first, in the
control group, is there evidence that deck selections begin to discriminate good from bad
decks before the trial at which advantageous wagering first occurs? This is the key piece of
evidence for an unconscious influence on decision-making. Secondly, does quantitative
questioning bring forward the point at which advantageous wagering occurs, as Persaud et al.
suggested? Thirdly, what is the comparison between wagering and quantitative judgments in
the questionnaire group? Although they included such a group, Persaud et al. did not report
the quantitative judgments their participants made. Even if making these judgments has the
effect of focusing participants’ attention on the task and rendering them more rapidly aware
of the task structure (and hence improves wagering), it is still of considerable interest to
examine such data. Importantly, we can ask whether the quantitative assessments participants
make at their first assessment (trial 20) – when questioning cannot have had any effect on
task awareness – reveals awareness which is undetected by the wagering measure.
Experiment 1 thus aimed to replicate the design and methodology employed by
Persaud et al. (2007). One difference between our experiment and Persaud et al.’s lies in the
format of the IGT. We used a computerized version of the IGT whereas Persaud et al. used a
classic manual format (see Bechara et al., 1994). Previous studies observed no differences in
the pattern of deck selections between format types, however (Bechara, Tranel, et al., 2000;
Bowman et al., 2005). Table 2 lists the task features that we varied across the experiments
reported here.
Method
Participants. Thirty volunteers (20 females) between the ages of 19 and 30 years (M
= 22.66, SD = 2.96) were recruited from the University College London subject pool. All
participants received £3 for their participation. Across experiments, the sample sizes were
chosen in order to match or somewhat exceed those in Persaud et al.’s (2007) original study,
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12 per group. In Experiments 1, 2, 4A, and 4B the sample sizes were between 15-30 per
group (15, 30, 19, 21, respectively). The only exception was Experiment 3, in which we
collected data from 38-40 participants per group. These participants were UCL undergraduate
psychology students participating in a compulsory laboratory class.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups (no questioning
[control], quantitative questioning [questionnaire]). The control group made a high or a low
wager following each deck choice whereas the questionnaire group, in addition to wagering,
were asked a subset of the Maia and McClelland (2004) questions every 20 trials. In the
original study, the questionnaire was given to participants every 10 trials after the first
administration on trial 20. We reduced the frequency of administering the questionnaire to
limit fatigue.
Task. A computerized variant of the IGT was employed. There were four decks of
cards with labels A, B, C, and D. The rewards and punishments were the same as in Persaud
et al. (2007) and these were dependent on the quality of the deck (Good or Bad) and the
wager (High: £20 or Low: £10). Specifically, selecting a card from the bad decks (A and B)
yielded a win of two times (2 ×) the wager (High: £40, Low: £20) whereas selecting a card
from the good decks (C and D) returned the wagered amount (1 ×) (High: £20, Low: £10).
Also, some trials carried a punishment; the distribution and frequency of the punishments
were as for the original IGT whereas the magnitude was adjusted to reflect the ratio of loss to
win of the original IGT (see Appendix A for the reward and punishment schedule).
Participants in both groups were given an initial endowment of £400 of play money
and were asked to maximize their earnings. The task comprised 100 card selections. After
each card selection, a frame appeared on the screen with two alternative choices, “High
(₤20)” and “Low (₤10)”, allowing participants to place a wager on their card selection. Along 
with wagering the questionnaire group was administered a modified version of Maia and
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McClelland’s (2004) questionnaire (see Appendix B). The qualitative parts of the
questionnaire were omitted and it was administered every 20 trials. Participants were asked to
provide ratings of the “goodness” of each deck, to report or calculate amounts of money
related to the decks’ payoffs, and to indicate which deck they would select cards from for the
rest of the task if they could only choose from one deck.
Instructions were presented on the screen before the experiment started. At the top of
the display was a green bar that expanded or contracted according to the amount of money
won or lost after each deck selection and wager. Every time a participant clicked on a deck to
pick a card, the deck was highlighted and the wagering frame appeared on the screen. After
the wagering selection, the face of that card appeared on the top of the deck showing the
amount of money behind the card and a message was displayed on the screen indicating the
amount of money won or lost. Once the money had been added or subtracted, the face of the
card disappeared and the participant could select another card.
Procedure. Participants sat in front of a PC display. They were then asked to read the
on-screen instructions about the task. In brief, participants were told that the game was about
learning to gamble on card selections, that all of the cards would yield some money but some
would lose money, that their objective was to win as much as money as possible, and that
they were free to switch from one deck to another at any time. Additionally, participants were
presented with instructions about wagering. Specifically, they were told that if they were
confident that their choice would give them some net winnings, then they should wager high,
otherwise, they should make a low wager. The questionnaire group was presented with
instructions about the quantitative questions. Each session ended after 100 trials.
Results
Choice and wagering. Advantageous wagering was defined as either a high wager
after choosing a good deck or a low wager after choosing a bad deck. Our analyses employed
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the average proportion of good deck selections (choice) and advantageous wagers (wagering)
across subjects over successive blocks of 10 trials to investigate any differences between the
two groups (control, questionnaire) and to locate the onset of learning and awareness (see
Figure 1).
The onset of deck discrimination, as revealed by the first block in which choice of the
good decks was significantly above chance (0.50), was at block 4 for both conditions
(Control: M = 0.63, t(14) = 3.25, p = .006, d = 0.84, Questionnaire: M = 0.70, t(14) = 5.29, p
<.001, d = 1.37). Advantageous wagering exceeded chance level (0.50) at the same time as
choice, also in block 4 (Control: M = 0.63, t(14) = 3.08, p = .008, d = 0.80, Questionnaire: M
= 0.66, t(14) = 3.43, p =.004, d = 0.89). These results indicate that there was no advancement
in the onset of advantageous wagering in the quantitative questioning group who made
explicit judgments about the deck payoffs.
Two separate mixed ANOVAs were performed on the proportion of good deck
selections and advantageous wagers across blocks of 10 trials. It is important to note that
even though they use the same scale, the two measures cannot be compared directly because
advantageous wagering is dependent on the first-order decision (e.g., deck selection) and this
creates the possibility of functional differences between the measurement scales. For
example, if a participant always chooses a good deck (with the proportion of good deck
selections therefore being 1.0), but decides to make both high and low wagers because she is
more confident on some trials than others, then advantageous wagering cannot attain a value
of 1.0. Its maximum value under such circumstances would be equal to the proportion of high
wagers. Like Persaud et al. (2007), our contrast between deck selection and wagering is
therefore an indirect one, based on estimating the trial block at which each reaches a level
significantly above chance. This contrast is likely, if anything, to be biased in favor of
obtaining evidence of learning without awareness. Both measures could be numerically above
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chance, but deck selection might be significantly so and wagering not (it might be a noisier
measure, for instance).
A 2 (group [control, questionnaire]; between) × 10 (block: 10 trials each; within)
mixed ANOVA was performed to assess group differences on good deck selections. For the
main effect of block, polynomial contrasts were also applied. The analysis revealed a
significant main effect of block, F(9, 252) = 26.80, MSE = 3.00, p <.001, ηୋଶ = 0.39 (for
generalized eta squared, ீߟଶ, see Bakeman, 2005), indicating that participants learned about
the quality of each deck as there was a tendency for choice to increase across time
(significant linear and quadratic effects, p<.001). The main effect of group did not reach
significance, F(1, 28) = 0.92, MSE = 10.94, p = .35,ீߟ ଶ = 0.01, and the interaction between
group and block was not significant, F(9, 252) = 0.39, MSE = 3.00, p = .94, ீߟ ଶ = 0.01,
suggesting that the mean proportion of good deck selections across blocks was similar in the
two conditions. This finding is in accordance with Persaud et al.’s (2007) results: in their
study more detailed questioning did not affect participants’ deck-selection strategies. In other
words, when awareness is probed by more “invasive” methods, no effect is observed in the
application of this knowledge to decision-making behavior.
Analysis of the proportion of advantageous wagers revealed a similar pattern of
results. Again, the main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 28) < 1, MSE = 13.12, p =
.86. Participants were able to maximize their winnings as the proportion of advantageous
wagers increased across blocks, F(9, 252) = 19.35, MSE = 3.44, p <.001, ீߟଶ= 0.32. The
interaction between group and block was not significant, F(9, 252) = 0.46, MSE = 3.44, p =
.90,ீߟ ଶ = 0.01.
In the Supplemental Materials we present analyses of participants’ wagering behavior
in terms of signal detection theory for this and all subsequent experiments. These analyses
confirm the key conclusions using a method which allows sensitivity (the ability to use
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wagering responses to discriminate between good and bad decks) and bias (preference for
wagering high or low) to be separately determined.
These results indicate that participants favored the good decks and became gradually
capable of maximizing their winnings by placing appropriate wagers. The estimated onsets of
good deck selections are consistent with those reported by Persaud et al. (2007) (also see,
Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O’Connor, 2005; Wagar & Dixon, 2006), namely on
trials 40 and 36 (block 4) for their control and questionnaire groups, respectively. The key
result though is that advantageous wagering developed according to approximately the same
time-course as choice behavior. The extra requirement to rate the quality of the decks and
answer questions about the payoffs did not affect participants’ decision-making or wagering
strategies. Since choice and wagering displayed similar patterns in both groups there is no
evidence of a dissociation between learning and awareness of the optimal strategy, assuming
that wagering is indeed a valid index of awareness. The simultaneous onset of awareness in
the two groups also contradicts the main claim of Persaud et al. (2007) about learning without
awareness in the IGT. Specifically, Persaud et al. reported that in their control group, where
no quantitative questions were asked, advantageous wagering lagged behind deck selections
whereas this was not the case in their quantitative questioning group. This pattern was not
observed here1.
Questionnaire. Participants’ knowledge regarding the advantageous strategy in the
questionnaire group was explored. Two of the measures reflect knowledge about the general
quality of each deck and the remaining two about the actual payoffs. For questions 1 and 4
(see Appendix B) if a participant gives the highest rating to one of the two best decks and
selects one of the two best decks to pick cards until the end of the experiment, that means the
participant possesses accurate knowledge about the task. In the same manner, when the
highest reported (Question 2.1) and calculated net (Questions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) is attributed to
AWARENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 23
one of the best decks, this indicates high levels of awareness. The calculated net (CN) for
each participant, deck, and question period is obtained using the following equation: CN=
Q2.2 + (Q2.3 / 10) × Q2.4.
Figure 1B shows the proportion of participants whose answers favored the good decks
on each of the questionnaire measures. Participants whose verbal responses did not
discriminate between good and bad decks (i.e., they give the same ratings or the same
reported net for all decks) do not count towards this proportion. Inspection of the figure
shows that participants exhibited substantial knowledge about the quality of each deck even
in the first assessment period (trial 20). Not only did they rate the good decks higher than the
bad decks, but also they had a firm basis for such an attribution as revealed by their reported
and calculated net payoffs. Table 3 shows the mean deck ratings (-10 very bad, +10 very
good) for each deck and the proportion of selections throughout the task for both groups. The
results show a clear trend, that is the more positive the rating for a deck, the more likely the
deck was to be selected. This correlation between ratings and selections adds further support
to the view that decision strategies in the IGT develop in parallel with explicit knowledge.
The use of the questionnaire allowed us to explore differences between the two
measures (i.e., post-decision wagering and questionnaire) in terms of how sensitive each is in
assessing participants’ awareness. It is important to check whether the quantitative questions
reveal more knowledge about the task than wagering in the first assessment (trial 20).
However, the two measures are not directly comparable due to the fact that the questionnaire
was administered once at trial 20 whereas participants placed wagers after each deck
selection. To overcome this problem we classified each participant as aware or unaware
based on the average proportion of advantageous wagers placed across trials 16-25. If the
average was equal to or greater than .5, then participants were identified as aware of the
advantageous strategy. The proportion of participants classified as aware by the wagering
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measure was then compared against the proportion of participants who favored one of the two
good decks in Question 4 (i.e., deck-selected measure). We used the deck-selected measure
because it requires only one response and is therefore similar to wagering. To see whether the
two proportions were significantly different (deck-selected: 0.67, wagering: 0.33) we used the
McNemar test for dependent proportions (see Agresti, 2002; Wild & Seber, 1993) which was
found to be non-significant, χ2(1) = 2.78, p = .096, possibly due to the small sample size
(N=15). Nevertheless, the numerical difference suggests that wagering underestimates
participants’ acquired knowledge possibly due to the effects of biases in participants’
wagering strategies.
Discussion
We draw three principal conclusions from Experiment 1. First, under the conditions
tested here awareness as measured by wagering tracked deck selections quite closely. We
found no indication that wagering lagged behind the selection of good decks, with both
measures becoming reliably better than chance fairly early in the task, between trials 30 and
40. Secondly, the results of the explicit questions revealed that wagering, if anything,
underestimates task insight. As early as trial 20, the majority of participants were able to give
accurate reports about the quality of the different decks. Thirdly, there was no evidence that
eliciting explicit reports in the questionnaire group altered participants’ wagering strategy.
Persaud et al. (2007) did report such a bias, but it was not observed here. Regardless of
whether they explicitly reported their task knowledge, participants began to wager
advantageously in block 4 (and this is about the same point at which they began to reliably
select the better decks).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 obtained no evidence of a dissociation between learning and awareness.
Experiment 2 further examines the utility of wagering as a valid alternative to verbal reports
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for assessing awareness by applying two modifications to Persaud et al.’s (2007) procedure.
First, the original reward and punishment schedule of the IGT was used, and secondly we
tested the modified pay-off matrix proposed by Clifford et al. (2008). As noted earlier, the
pay-off matrix used by Persaud et al. encourages rational participants to employ the weakly-
dominant strategy of making high wagers all the time, irrespective of the knowledge they
possess about the decks (see Table 1). The modified version of the pay-off matrix, in contrast,
encourages participants to wager low under uncertainty and to wager high when they have
acquired some knowledge about the decks.
Specifically, in the modified matrix participants are discouraged from wagering high
until they feel confident that their decision is a good one. When discriminative knowledge
about the decks is absent or low, it is advantageous to wager low. This can be shown by the
expected payoff from wagering low which is +1/2 [(+2 -1)/2] compared to 0 [(+5-5)/2] from
wagering high. However, when deck discrimination is better than chance, it is more
rewarding to wager high due to a larger payoff with a good/high combination (+5) than a
good/low one (+2). Based on this matrix a rational participant (i.e., a participant who seeks to
maximize gains) would start to wager high only when her deck discrimination (probability of
selecting a good deck is) 4/7 or .57. The latter can be computed from the differential loss of
wagering on a bad decision (5-1=4) divided by the sum of the differential loss and the
differential gain of wagering on a good decision (5-2=3) (Clifford et al., 2008).
Experiment 2 therefore allows us to ask two main questions. First, we have another
opportunity to examine whether awareness as measured by wagering lags behind deck
selection. Secondly, we can ask whether the modified payoff matrix locates the onset of
awareness at an earlier point than the original matrix. Given that Experiment 1 suggested that
wagering (under the original matrix) locates the onset of awareness far too late (in
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comparison to numerical reports on the values of the decks), it is possible that the modified
matrix will yield a more appropriate, earlier, estimate.
Method
Participants. Sixty healthy volunteers participated (28 females, age M = 22.32, SD =
3.02). Thirty-five participants were recruited via the subject pool and the rest were
undergraduate students who received course credit for participating. Participants were
randomly assigned to the two conditions.
Design. The simple-wagering group participated in a replication of Persaud et al.’s
(2007) IGT task with wagering. The differences between Persaud et al.’s study and this
experiment are that we employed the original reward and punishment schedule of the IGT,
and the wagers were divided by a factor of 10 (see Table 2). The modified-wagering group
was administered the IGT with wagering but using the pay-off matrix proposed by Clifford et
al. (2008) (see Table 1).
Task. The reward and punishment schedule used in this study was the same as in the
original IGT. After selecting a card from decks A and B participants won £100 whereas on
decks C and D they won £50. However, on some trials, there was a punishment which was
larger on decks A and B compared to decks C and D. On deck A, 50% of the trials carried a
punishment (varying from £150 to £350) leading to an overall loss of £250 every 10 trials.
On deck B, the net outcome was the same as in deck A (-£25 per card) but there was one
large loss (£1250) every 10 trials. The same pattern was present on decks C and D; on deck
C, 5 out of 10 trials had a punishment (from £25 to £75) leading to an overall gain of £250
(+£25 per card) whereas on deck D, there was one loss (£250) every 10 trials.
After each card selection in the simple wagering group, a new frame appeared on the
screen with two alternative choices, “High (£2)” and “Low (£1)”, allowing participants to
place a wager on their card selection. The amount behind the card was multiplied either by 2
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or 1 according to wager selection. In the modified wagering group, the procedure was the
same, except that the wagers were not expressed as amounts of money but simply as “High”
and “Low”. This is because the final amount of money won or lost after each card selection
was multiplied by the appropriate weights in the modified pay-off matrix.
The task again comprised 100 card selections. Because there were only 40 cards in
each deck, it was possible to run out of cards from a given deck (as in the original IGT – this
was not the case in Experiment 1). When this happened, a message appeared on the screen
instructing participants to stop choosing from that deck and to continue selecting from the
remaining decks.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results
Choice and Wagering. The method for identifying the onset of good deck selections
and advantageous wagering was the same as in Experiment 1 (see Figures 2A and 2B). Good
deck selection commenced on block 5 for the simple wagering group, M = 0.63, t(29) = 3.20,
p = .003, d = 0.58, but on block 4 for the modified wagering group, M = 0.68, t(29) = 4.81, p
<.001, d = 0.88. There hence seems to be a small difference in the onset of learning between
the two groups. Additionally, a difference was observed regarding the onset of advantageous
wagering. Specifically, in the simple wagering group awareness arose relatively late in the
task, on block 7, M = 0.61, t(29) = 2.82, p =.008, d = 0.51, whereas participants started to
place appropriate wagers on block 4 in the modified wagering group, M = 0.69, t(29) = 5.48,
p <.001, d = 1.00.
A 2 (group [simple wagering, modified wagering]; between) × 10 (block: 10 trials
each; within) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of good deck selections revealed a non-
significant main effect of group, F(1, 58) = 0.22, MSE = 5.24, p = .65. There was a
significant main effect of block, F(7.19, 416.22) = 32.59, MSE = 4.22, p <.001, ீߟଶ= 0.33
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(significant linear and quadratic trends). The analysis also revealed a significant group ×
block interaction, F(7.19, 416.22) = 2.18, MSE = 4.22, p = .022, ீߟଶ= 0.03 (Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Simple effects analyses showed a significant difference on block 4 (F(1,
58) = 14.86, MSE = 3.77, p<.001) which is consistent with the difference reported above in
the onset of good deck selections between the two groups.
A similar analysis was performed on the proportion of advantageous wagers. The
main effect of group was significant, F(1, 58) = 4.15, MSE = 12.02, p =.046, ீߟଶ= 0.02, as
participants in the modified wagering group demonstrated higher proportions of
advantageous wagers across blocks. The main effect of block was significant, F(9, 522) =
16.88, MSE = 3.65, p <.001, ீߟଶ= 0.18. The difference between the two groups in awareness
was further supported by a significant group × block interaction, F(9, 522) = 3.36, MSE =
3.65, p <.001, ீߟଶ= 0.04, with reliable differences in blocks 4, 5, 6, and 7 (simple effects
comparisons, p < .05), reflecting the later onset of awareness in the simple wagering group.
These results demonstrate that awareness lagged behind deck selections in the simple
wagering group which is in accordance with the dissociation between the two measures
observed by Persaud et al. (2007). In addition it appears that asymmetric weights in the pay-
off matrix of the modified wagering group helped participants to perform advantageously
earlier in the task.
Discussion
Whereas Experiment 1 revealed no lag between deck selection and awareness – the
latter measured by wagering – the present experiment did reveal such a lag in the simple
wagering group, of approximately 2 blocks of trials. In this group, advantageous deck
selections became reliable at block 5 whereas wagering only became significantly better than
chance in block 7. Presumably one of the minor procedural changes between Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 (see Table 2) led to the difference in findings. In addition, the difference in
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findings cannot be ascribed to low statistical power to detect the effect found in Experiment
1. Specifically, the question is whether Experiment 2 (simple wagering group) had adequate
power to detect an awareness effect at block 5 (which is where good selection started) of the
magnitude seen in Experiment 1 (control group) at block 4 (which is where awareness
emerged in that group; d = 0.8). The relevant power figure is 0.82 which indicates adequate
statistical power to detect the awareness effect of Experiment 1 (control group).
The reward and punishment schedule used in Experiment 2 was the same as in the
original IGT. In fact, the pattern of deck selections was slightly different compared to
Experiment 1 (compare Table 3 and Figures 2C and 2D). Deck B was selected more often
which is in accordance with previous studies that used the original IGT and evaluated the
perceived “badness” of deck B (Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007). Examination of choice
behavior in Experiment 1 (Table 3) and Persaud et al.’s (2007) study reveals a different
pattern, which is not present in studies with the original IGT payoff schedule. Put differently,
the reward and punishment schedule used in Experiment 1 turns out to be easier to learn than
that of the original IGT in Experiment 2. Fernie and Tunney (2008) identified difficulties
with the manipulations of the reward and punishment schedule of the IGT; because wins, loss
probability and magnitude, and overall expected values are all confounded with each other it
is difficult to ascertain which aspect of the schedule has a bigger effect on choice behavior.
Although the lag observed in the simple wagering group (which replicates what
Persaud et al., 2007, found) might be taken as evidence that advantageous deck selection is
driven initially by unconscious influences, the results from the modified wagering group
suggest caution in drawing such a conclusion, because a relatively small change in the payoff
matrix brought wagering back into line with deck selections (and led participants to select
from the good decks slightly earlier than those exposed to the original matrix). Why might
this have happened? One hypothesis is that it arises because the original payoff matrix
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discourages participants from thinking carefully about the wagers they place, especially
before they have learned which are the best decks. There is a possibility that Persaud et al.’s
matrix led participants to believe that, prior to learning, wagering had no overall effect on
their winnings. As noted previously, it is indeed the case that with a symmetric matrix and
random deck selection, it makes no difference how the participant wagers. Participants may
therefore have stopped thinking carefully about their wagers. As the optimal weakly
dominant strategy using the original matrix is always to wager high (Clifford et al., 2008),
this means that the payoffs are independent of the wagers, and thus participants may have
believed that their wagers were irrelevant. When they started to learn about the quality of
each deck and discovered that their wagers might be relevant to the encountered payoffs, it
may then have taken them longer to implement this new knowledge into their wagering
strategy, leading to an apparent late onset of awareness. In contrast, the asymmetric payoffs
of the modified matrix encourage participants to believe that it matters whether they wager
high or low, even before they start to choose the good decks. In other words, the original pay-
off matrix did not guide participants to express their knowledge as their wagering choices
were random and not consistent with their deck selections.
Experiment 3
The purpose of this experiment was to compare post-decision wagering with
confidence ratings, the simplest and most commonly used measure of awareness (for some
examples see Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees,
2010; Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchon, & Cleeremans, 2013; Tunney & Shanks, 2003).
Confidence ratings are metacognitive reports about having performed a judgment or
discrimination accurately (e.g., perception of a subliminal visual stimulus) or having selected
the best from a set of alternatives (e.g., selection of a good deck in the IGT). Confidence
ratings can be expressed in a binary way such as “not confident” and “very confident”
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(different labels have been employed such as “guessing” and “knowing”) or on a continuous
Likert-like scale.
In this experiment we used a 2-point confidence scale in order to make a direct
comparison with binary wagering, and also a 4-point scale to gain deeper insights into the
confidence-performance relationship.
Method
Participants. There were 118 participants in the experiment (97 females, age
M=18.73, SD=0.90), all of whom were psychology undergraduate students at University
College London who took part in fulfillment of a course requirement. The 6 best performers
on the task were awarded £15 each.
Design. The experiment consisted of three different conditions: binary wagering
(N=40), binary confidence ratings (N=40) and 4-point confidence ratings (N=38). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.
Task. The original IGT payoff schedule was used across conditions (as in
Experiment 2). After each card selection, participants were asked to indicate their awareness
of the deck payoffs using wagering or confidence ratings. In the binary wagering condition,
participants had to place a wager, High (£2) or Low (£1), which multiplied the payoffs
associated with each deck and trial (this condition was identical to the simple wagering
condition of Experiment 2). In the binary confidence condition, participants were asked to
express their confidence in having selected a good deck using the descriptions 1 = “I am not
confident” and 2 = “I am very confident”. The descriptions for the 4-point confidence scale
were 1 = “I am guessing”, 2 = “I am not confident”, 3 = “I am quite confident”, and 4 = “I am
very confident”.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of previous experiments, with the
exception that a different set of instructions was presented for the confidence ratings measure.
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Results
Choice and Awareness. Evidence of conscious knowledge regarding the optimal
strategy in the binary wagering condition was obtained using advantageous wagering (a high
wager after a good deck and a low wager after a bad deck). The same principle was applied to
the confidence ratings conditions so that the combinations good deck/high confidence and
bad deck/low confidence were taken to indicate conscious knowledge. In this stage of the
analysis the 4-point scale was dichotomized with confidence levels 1 and 2 collapsed to
signify low confidence and 3 and 4 collapsed to give high confidence. We then identified the
onset of choice and awareness as the first block at which performance was significantly
above chance (0.5) for each of the three conditions (see Figure 3). With this method, good
deck selections exceeded the chance level on block 5 for the binary confidence ratings, M =
0.60; t(39) = 3.00, p = .004, d = 0.48, and wagering groups, M = 0.60; t(39) = 2.82, p = .007,
d = 0.45, and block 6 for the 4-point confidence group, M = 0.62; t(37) = 3.73, p < .001, d =
0.61. These results indicate slightly later (about 1 block) deck discrimination than in previous
experiments.
Regarding conscious knowledge of the deck values, confidence ratings significantly
exceeded chance at the same time as or earlier than choice in the confidence rating groups,
namely at block 5 in both cases (2pts scale: M = 0.62; t(39) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 0.62, 4pts
scale: M = 0.58; t(37) = 2.28, p = .029, d = 0.37), whereas there was a delay of (at least) one
block in the onset of conscious knowledge as indexed by wagering (block 6), M = 0.59; t(39)
= 2.23, p = .031, d = 0.35. This last result replicates what was observed in the simple
wagering group of Experiment 2, namely a delay in the onset of awareness. In both groups,
deck discrimination became significant at block 5, while advantageous wagering did not
become significant until block 6 (Experiment 3, wagering) or block 7 (Experiment 2, simple
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wagering). In fact the data from the two groups are more similar still, as in the present
wagering group wagering was not significantly greater than chance in blocks 7, 8, and 9.
A 3 (group) × 10 (block) mixed ANOVA on the mean proportion of good deck
selections showed no main effect of group, F(2, 115) = 0.88, MSE = 15.05, p =.42, ீߟଶ=
0.004, but there was a significant effect of block F(7.38, 848.97) = 47.86, MSE = 3.65, p <
.001, ீߟଶ= 0.22. Also, no significant interaction between group and block (main effect) was
observed, F(14.76, 848.97) = 0.73, MSE = 3.65, p = .75, ீߟଶ= 0.008 (Greenhouse-Geisser
correction). In general, these results suggest that the acquisition of the advantageous strategy
was not substantially affected by the different subjective measures of awareness and
participants were able to learn to discriminate between the decks based on their overall
expected values.
The second important conclusion from this analysis refers to the pattern of overall
deck selections; despite the fact that participants learned to discriminate between the decks,
this learning effect was rather weak. Figures 3D-F illustrate that participants did not take into
account the infrequent but rather large losses in deck B as this deck was selected as often as
deck D, showing a strong loss-frequency effect. Interestingly, deck B was the overall deck of
choice in the 4-points confidence group (Figure 3E).
The same type of analysis was applied to mean performance on the awareness
measures. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 115) = 3.96, MSE
= 11.68, p = .022, ீߟଶ=0.02, which was mainly driven by a significant difference between the
overall means of binary confidence ratings (M = 0.59) and wagering (M = 0.52) (Tukey HSD,
p = .016). No other significant differences between the three measures were observed. The
main effect of block was significant, F(7.63, 877.57) = 21.41, MSE = 3.70, p < .001,
ீߟଶ=0.12, indicating that participants’ responses in the confidence and wagering measures
were consistent with learning of the advantageous strategy. Participants were able to
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demonstrate conscious knowledge which closely tracked their decisions. Also, the interaction
between group and the block main effect did not reach significance, F(15.26, 877.57) = 1.04,
MSE = 3.70, p = .41.
Analysis of the 4-point confidence ratings. We examined the 4-point confidence
ratings in order to provide a more detailed assessment of conscious knowledge in the IGT by
employing a nonparametric receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. Two separate
ROC curves were constructed, one before the onset of good deck selections (blocks 1-5) and
one after (blocks 6-10). Deck selection performance did not significantly change across
blocks 6-10, F(4, 148) = 0.97, p = .43, allowing for a finer examination of the respective
ROC curve. Figure 4 shows that the probability of selecting a good deck gradually increases
with confidence in blocks 6-10 whereas the straight ROC line for blocks 1-5 is indicative of a
poor relationship between accuracy and confidence. The Type 2 sensitivity derived from
these curves (A, the area under the ROC curve) indicated above-chance (.50) metacognitive
discriminability for blocks 6-10, A = .65, 95% CI [.63 .68], but not for blocks 1-5, A = .48, 95
CI [.46 .51] (for the calculation of confidence intervals see Delong, Delong, &
Clarkepearson, 1988). In addition, fitting the ROC model to each individual participant for
blocks 6-10 revealed substantial variability across participants (see Figure 4B).
This fine-grained assessment of the confidence-accuracy relationship suggests that
participants’ decisions were accompanied by fairly accurate confidence reports. It is also
important to investigate how participants utilized the confidence rating scale and whether
there was any involvement of unconscious or implicit knowledge after the onset of good deck
selection (blocks 6-10). The latter was assessed by using the guessing criterion (Dienes et al.,
1995) according to which unconscious knowledge is present when participants can
discriminate between good and bad decks at above chance levels when they are guessing or
their confidence is low. We calculated the percentage of good deck selections for each
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confidence level. Importantly, at neither of the two low-confidence levels (i.e., 1 = “I’m
guessing” and 2 = “I’m not confident”) did deck selection significantly exceed chance (0.50)
(Means for each level: 1 = 0.47, 2 = 0.49, 3= 0.72, 4 =0.78), indicating that good deck
selections were not made under conditions of low confidence and that conscious knowledge
strongly associated with above-chance performance on the IGT. Also, the mean confidence
following good deck selections was 2.66 (SEM = 0.10) and for bad deck selections was 2.08
(SEM = 0.09). The difference between these values was significant, t(37) = 8.50, p<.001,
suggesting the same conclusion as the guessing criterion. Participants were more confident
when they made a good than a bad deck choice.
Discussion
The present experiment provides another demonstration of the involvement of
conscious knowledge in the IGT. When participants started to consistently sample from the
good decks, they were able to report their acquired knowledge through their confidence
ratings. However, post-decision wagering showed a similar pattern as in the simple wagering
condition of Experiment 2, namely a lag in the onset of wagering compared to deck selection.
While this latter pattern might be indicative of unconscious processes in choice behavior, the
results from the confidence groups suggest a simpler explanation, namely that wagering is an
insensitive measure of awareness.
The confidence rating scales produced similar results when the 4-point scale was
collapsed into two categories. A more detailed examination of the continuous scale revealed
that participants’ deck selections were accompanied by accurate confidence ratings.
Specifically, the ROC analysis showed increased metacognitive monitoring after the point at
which performance on the IGT began to exceed chance. While the presence of conscious
knowledge does not necessarily mean that unconscious or implicit processing is absent, using
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the guessing criterion we showed that confidence ratings and deck selections are highly
related to one another.
Experiments 4A and 4B
Experiment 2 showed that the exact form of the pay-off matrix can affect participants’
wagering strategy, with the Clifford et al. (2008) payoff matrix bringing forward by several
blocks the point at which above-chance awareness was located. The sensitivity of wagering to
small procedural changes undermines its reliability as a measure of awareness. Yet the results
of Experiment 2 might nevertheless encourage the view that wagering under the modified
matrix is an accurate measure (and the results of Experiment 1, in which wagering again
developed early, might be interpreted in the same way). Even though wagering tracks choice
under the modified matrix, does this mean that wagering is a reliable and sensitive measure of
awareness? In Experiment 4A we address this question by measuring awareness both with
Clifford et al.’s payoff matrix and simultaneously with Maia and McClelland’s (2004)
quantitative questions in a probabilistic alternative version of the IGT. Experiment 4B is a
replication of Experiment’s 2 modified wagering condition with the inclusion of Maia and
McClelland’s questionnaire.
Experiment 4A
Method
Participants. Twenty-one volunteers participated (13 females, age M=23.45,
SD=3.56), all of whom were recruited via the departmental subject pool. They were paid £2
for their participation and an additional amount between £0 and £3, depending on their
performance in the task.
Task. A variation of the original IGT was employed in which the allocation of wins
and losses on each trial was sampled at random from the overall distribution (for a similar
task see Schonberg, Daw, Joel, & O'Doherty, 2007). This modification removes many of the
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complications that arise from using the typical IGT structure in which the disadvantageous
decks are initially good (because losses do not occur early in the task), eliminating the
predominant preference for the bad decks (see Fellows & Farah, 2005). The payoff structure
of each deck was different from the original IGT; the pay-off matrix of Clifford et al. (2008)
was used to determine the payoffs received by participants on each trial, in such a way that
the amount won or lost was dependent on card selection and wagering. For example, based
on the contingencies of Table 1, a payoff of 2 is always associated with a good deck selection
and a low wager. Whether this amount was a win or loss was defined by the distribution of
outcomes associated with each deck. Specifically, for decks A and B, the probability of a loss
was .75 and .60 respectively, whereas for decks C and D, the probability of a win was .75 and
.60, respectively, resulting in different overall expected payoffs for each deck. In contrast to
the original IGT (where the win on each trial could be coupled with a loss), the outcome on
each trial was either a net win or a loss and participants could win or lose points, not real or
facsimile money.
The task comprised 100 card selections. Each deck had 60 randomly predefined wins
and losses based on the probabilities programmed for that deck. After each card selection,
participants could place a wager, either High or Low, on their card selection. Based on the
combination of deck selection and wagering, participants were presented with a single
amount, either a win or a loss. Along with wagering, participants’ conscious knowledge was
assessed using a modified version of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) questionnaire. The
qualitative parts of the questionnaire were omitted and it was administered every 20 trials.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 4A was identical to that of previous
experiments.
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Results and Discussion
Choice and Wagering. The method for identifying the onset of good deck selections
and advantageous wagering was the same as in previous experiments. Performance exceeded
the chance level on block 1 for both measures (Choice: M = 0.59, t(20) = 2.83, p = .01, d =
0.62, Wagering: M = 0.65, t(20) = 3.80, p = .001, d = 0.83) (see Figure 5A).
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of block on good deck
selections, F(9, 180) = 12.40, MSE= 2.32, p <.001, ீߟଶ = 0.28. Wagering performance
closely followed the optimal decision-making strategy as demonstrated by a main effect of
block, F(4.92, 98.46) = 4.92, MSE = 2.23, p <.001, ீߟଶ=0.13. These findings are consistent
with the previous results relating to the modified payoff matrix, indicating no dissociation
between performance and awareness. In fact, the pattern of both good deck selections and
advantageous wagering is similar to the modified wagering condition in Experiment 2, albeit
with accelerated learning.
Rapid learning can be explained by the probabilistic allocation of wins and losses on
each trial. Fellows and Farah (2005) found that in their shuffled IGT version (the order of the
decks was changed so that losses from the bad decks occurred at the start of the task) normal
control participants selected more cards from the good decks even in the first 20 trials and
they kept on choosing the good decks throughout the task. Our probabilistic version of the
payoff schedule removes the reversal learning component (that is, to learn that the decks
which yield higher rewards are disadvantageous in the long run) of the IGT which can be
slow and delay learning of the optimal decisions.
Since each deck had different overall expected payoffs we investigated whether
participants could discriminate not only between good and bad decks but also within each
pair of decks (A vs B and C vs D). Participants selected more cards from the good decks in
all blocks, t(20) = 12.02, p<.001, and this tendency increased from block 1 to block 5. Also,
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they selected more cards from deck C compared to deck D, t(20) = 3.97, p<.001, d = 0.87.
No significant difference was observed between selections from decks A and B across blocks,
although participants tended to select more cards from deck B.
Questionnaire. Participants’ knowledge regarding the advantageous strategy was
further supported by the different measures of the questionnaire. Figure 5A shows that they
exhibited substantial knowledge about the quality of each deck, even in the first assessment
of awareness (trial 20). In fact, the observed pattern is similar to that in Experiment 1.
Importantly, the mean ratings for each deck give further support to the pattern of deck
selections shown in Figure 5B. Not only are the good decks selected more often than the bad
decks, but also participants’ ratings agree with the expected value of each deck. Table 4
shows that deck C is evaluated more positively than deck D even though both decks are
advantageous. In other words, knowledge about the quality of each deck led participants to
select more cards from deck C. Similarly, deck A (which has a higher probability of loss
compared to deck B) has the lowest mean rating.
However, the two measures of awareness are not directly comparable based on the
information shown in Figure 5A. We applied the same procedure as in Experiment 1 to test
whether the proportion of participants who preferred a good deck in the deck-selected
measure (.81) is significantly different from the proportion classified as aware of the optimal
strategy based on wagering (.76) on trials 16-25. The McNemar test for dependent
proportions was not significant, χ2(1)= 0.2, p = .65.
Another way of examining the two measures is to look at participants’ deck selection
and wagering in the trials following the administration of the questionnaire (trials 21, 41, 61,
81; we also include trial 100 immediately prior to the final administration of the
questionnaire). Specifically, we are interested in the verbal reports and wagers of those
participants who behave advantageously (i.e., select good decks) in these trials. Figure 6
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shows that the majority of participants demonstrate knowledge of the advantageous strategy
in all the questionnaire items. However, wagering underestimates the acquired knowledge in
all trials following the questionnaire compared to the verbal reports. Thus, it is evident that
the detailed and structured questions reflected high levels of awareness compared to
wagering.
Experiment 4B
Method
Participants. Nineteen volunteers participated (10 females, age M=24.95, SD=3.15)
from UCL’s subject pool. As in Experiment 4A, they received £2 for participation and an
additional fee up to £3 dependent on their performance in the task.
Task. The decision-making paradigm was identical to the modified wagering
condition of Experiment 2, that is, the payoff schedule was the same as in the original IGT
and wagering was expressed as a binary choice (“High” and “Low”). The extra component of
this experiment was the questionnaire of Maia and McClelland (2004) which was
administered every 20 trials.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of previous experiments.
Results and Discussion
Choice and Wagering. The mean probability of selecting a good deck and making an
advantageous wager exceeded chance on block 5 for both measures (Choice: M = 0.67, t(18)
= 3.21, p = .005, d = 0.70, Wagering: M = 0.65, t(18) = 3.51, p = .003, d = 0.77) (see Figure
7A). Compared to the onset of learning and awareness in Experiment 2, there seems to be a
lag of one block. Despite the fact that both measures are numerically above chance on block
4 (M Choice=0.57, M Wagering=0.53), neither is significant.
A repeated-measures ANOVA showed significant main effects of block on choice,
F(9, 162) = 12.72, p <.001, ீߟଶ=0.32, and wagering, F(9, 162) = 8.81, p <.001, ீߟଶ=0.28.
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These results agree with our previous experiments where we used the Clifford et al. (2008)
matrix (Experiment 2, modified wagering group; Experiment 4A). Learning of the good
decks and awareness progress in the same manner and no dissociation is observed.
Questionnaire. The proportion of participants whose responses favored the good
decks is illustrated in Figure 7A. The majority of participants showed a preference for the
good decks in the verbal questions except at the first question period where the proportion
was lower but still above chance.
The mean ratings for each deck (see Table 4) converge with the profile of deck
selections. Deck D has the highest mean rating which explains why this deck is selected more
often than the other decks see (Figure 7B). Even though decks C and D share the same
overall expected values, the small probability of loss on deck D affects the perceived
goodness of this deck. The same principle applies to deck B too; despite its overall negative
appraisal, it is selected as often as deck C. Also, the high probability of loss on deck A in
conjunction with the negative expected value led participants to negatively evaluate and to
avoid selecting cards from this deck.
In order to compare how sensitive the two methods are in assessing conscious
knowledge we again examined the proportion of participants who behaved advantageously in
the trials following the administration of the questionnaire (we again include trial 100 which
immediately preceded the final set of questions). Figure 8 demonstrates that in all question
periods the proportion of participants who translated their knowledge into a high wager is less
than the proportion who favored the good decks in their verbal reports. This pattern suggests
that wagering underestimated participants’ acquired knowledge and the more elaborated
questions detected higher levels of awareness. Despite the fact that wagering closely tracks
deck selections, it is not therefore an exhaustive and sensitive method to measure awareness.
This conclusion is supported by a significant difference between the proportion of
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participants who opted for one of the good decks in the deck-selected measure (.63) and the
proportion classified as aware based on wagering (.32) in the first administration of the
questionnaire, χ2(1) = 6, p = .014.
Discussion of Experiments 4A and 4B
The key point of Experiments 4A and 4B is that even though wagering closely tracks
deck selection and learning, it underestimates what participants have learned about the task
and deck contingencies. This also applies to the results of Experiment 2 where we found that
small procedural changes can affect the extent to which wagering tracks deck selection.
Finally, the analysis based on the trials following the administration of the
questionnaire suggests that acquired knowledge is not automatically translated into an
appropriate wager after a deck selection (Figures 6 and 8). Why is this? A possible reason is
loss aversion. The prospect of losing more money/points even if knowledge is above guessing
levels can be aversive.
General Discussion
The task of validating measures and methods of assessing awareness is an important
endeavour within psychological science as from the very beginnings of experimental
psychology, researchers have been interested in the distinction between conscious and
unconscious mental states (Dienes, 2008). In the present article we put post-decision
wagering under careful scrutiny because it is a method that supposedly removes biases and
complications associated with verbal judgments of conscious knowledge and it has been
extensively used in many areas of experimental psychology. Our purpose was twofold: first,
to evaluate post-decision wagering as a sensitive and direct method of awareness, and
secondly to investigate whether the claims of Persaud et al. (2007) about implicit influences
on decision-making under uncertainty are valid. A careful examination of wagering in
comparison with other measures of awareness such as confidence ratings and quantitative
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questions also allowed us to explore the type of information that is essential for optimal
decision-making and how participants use their acquired knowledge to make decisions in
uncertain environments.
The results of the present experiments do not offer any support for the claims of
Persaud et al. (2007) that learning to make advantageous decisions can occur in the absence
of awareness. As noted in the Introduction, research evaluating awareness in the Iowa
Gambling Task has formed a prominent and major element of the wider claim that
unconscious thoughts and signals can influence choice (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The present
work therefore bolsters recent suggestions (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014) that it is premature
to assign a fundamental role to such processes in theories of decision-making.
Experiment 1 was a near exact replication of Persaud et al.’s study. However, we only
replicated the results relating to the quantitative questioning group where deck selection and
advantageous wagering exceeded chance at the same time. In contrast to Persaud et al.’s
results, the same pattern was observed in the group that was asked only to make a wager after
their deck selection, suggesting no dissociation between choice and wagering.
In Experiment 2, following the criticisms about the dominance of high wagers in
Persaud et al.’s (2007) pay-off matrix, we tested the matrix proposed by Clifford et al. (2008)
using the reward and punishment schedule of the original IGT. Despite the fact that there was
a difference in the onset of learning and awareness in the simple wagering condition, no such
difference was observed in the modified wagering group. Thus we were able conceptually to
replicate Persaud et al.’s finding of a lag between choice and wagering, but a simple change
in the weights of the pay-off matrix was sufficient to make wagering a more sensitive
method.
In Experiment 3, we compared wagering with confidence ratings in an attempt to
identify structural differences between the two measures and to provide a better examination
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of knowledge assessment in the IGT by employing a 4-point confidence scale. While both
confidence scales (binary and continuous) showed conscious knowledge of the advantageous
strategy in the IGT, this was not the case for wagering, where we again replicated Persaud et
al.’s finding of a lag between choice and wagering. Thus wagering is a less sensitive measure
of awareness than confidence ratings. Also, knowledge in the IGT seems to be completely
conscious: when we applied the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995) to our data, there was
no evidence of unconscious processing.
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to measure wagering concurrently with explicit
questioning. Experiments 1 and 2 (modified wagering condition) showed that wagering can
closely track learning, but is that alone an adequate indicator of a robust method of measuring
awareness? We employed the questionnaire of Maia and McClelland (2004) in order to
examine how well wagering performs in comparison to another method of awareness. The
results showed that even though wagering followed deck selections, it is not a sensitive index
of awareness as it underestimates the knowledge that participants possess. We compared the
proportions of participants classified as consciously aware by the two measures. No
significant differences were observed in two of the experiments because of the small sample
sizes, even though more participants were identified as aware according to the questionnaire.
We ran the same analysis on the pooled data across experiments (N=55) and indeed there was
a significant difference between the deck-selected measure (.71) and wagering (.49), χ2(1) =
7.2, p = .007, indicating that there is some conscious knowledge about the task that is left
undetected by wagering (see Figure 9).
One possible criticism of the quantitative questions employed here and by Maia and
McClelland (2004) is that they might have a reflexive effect on the very property they are
attempting to measure, namely awareness. Recall that Persaud et al. found that the onset of
advantageous wagering was brought forward by as much as 30 trials when participants also
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had to periodically answer quantitative questions. We saw no hint of such a pattern in
Experiment 1.
It is important to emphasize that although our conclusions are very different from
those of Persaud et al. (2007), this is not because of any substantial disagreement about the
fundamental data patterns (apart from the aspect just mentioned). On the contrary, we were
able to reproduce the key finding they reported – a lag between deck discrimination and the
onset of advantageous wagering – in the simple wagering group of Experiment 2 and the
wagering group of Experiment 3. It is true that the conditions in which we obtained this
pattern were slightly different from those in which Persaud et al. obtained it (for example, in
our studies it depended on using the original IGT payoff schedule – see Table 2) and that in
the no questioning group of Experiment 1 we did not obtain it, despite the fact that this group
comprised a near-exact replication of Persaud et al.’s experiment, suggesting that some subtle
procedural factors influence whether or not a lag occurs. Where we are in disagreement is in
the interpretation of this lag. Whereas Persaud et al. took it as evidence of unconscious
influences in decision making that drive deck selections before participants become aware
and able to wager adaptively, we take the lag as evidence of the insensitivity of wagering.
Our case for this conclusion rests on the finding that the lag was eliminated or indeed
reversed as a result of (1) a minor change in the payoff matrix in the modified wagering
group of Experiment 2, (2) a switch from a binary wager response to either a binary or a 4-
point confidence response in Experiment 3, and (3) employing explicit verbal questions such
as “if you could only select cards from one of the decks until the end of the game… which of
the four decks would you pick?” to assess awareness.
Evidence against implicit influences
The claim that unconscious or implicit biases are essential for successful performance
in the IGT has not been confirmed in any of the experiments reported here. In fact,
AWARENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 46
participants’ explicit conscious knowledge runs in parallel with their deck selections.
Specifically, when participants’ awareness is measured by the detailed questionnaire, a
positive correlation between ratings and deck selections is observed (see Tables 3 and 4).
Dunn et al. (2006) suggested that there is little evidence to support the view that deck
contingencies are consciously impenetrable and what needs to be tested is whether
participants have an explicit understanding of the reward and punishment schedule or
whether they can merely discriminate the quality of the decks by attributing positive or
negative valences to each one. In fact, our questionnaire results demonstrate that participants
not only were able to show a general preference for the good decks but could also accurately
justify their preferences. For example, in Experiment 4A where each deck had different
expected values, participants made more choices from the deck with the highest expected
value (deck C) and they gave more positive ratings to this deck compared to the other good
deck (deck D, with a lower expected value).
The important role of conscious knowledge in the IGT is supported by a study
(Gutbrod et al., 2006) with amnesic patients whose deck selections were no better than
chance indicating that explicit task knowledge is essential for shaping a behavioral preference
towards the advantageous decks. Gutbrod et al. argued that the causal link between SCRs and
behavior “might not be straightforward and that a lack of explicit task knowledge may be
sufficient to explain why most of our patients failed to acquire a behavioral preference in the
IGT” (p. 1323). Similar findings were also reported by Gupta et al. (2009) who suggested that
declarative memory plays a significant role in forming and updating the representation of
rewards and punishments associated with each deck. In addition, Stout, Rodawalt, and
Siemers (2001) found that IGT impairments in Huntington’s disease patients were
significantly correlated with explicit memory deficits.
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In a recent study, Fernie and Tunney (2013) presented evidence suggesting that
autonomic activity or somatic markers are not important determinants of successful
performance on the IGT. They observed that conscious knowledge developed after
approximately 40 trials and was correlated with advantageous deck selections. Their main
results showed that aSCRs did not discriminate between decks prior to the emergence of
explicit knowledge, while reward SCRs differentiated between good and bad decks only for
those participants who had already acquired some knowledge about the decks’ quality.
Another interesting finding relates to the punishment SCRs; these were found to be of greater
magnitude following larger losses from the bad decks in the initial stages of the task but not
after the emergence of knowledge, indicating that participants became aware that the bad
decks produce big losses.
The previous findings highlight the importance of cognitive processes underlying
performance on the IGT and offer support for the view that emotional or affective signals
may not be as important as previously believed. Even though the involvement of emotion-
driven learning of the task structure and deck contingencies cannot be entirely ruled out (see
Wagar & Dixon, 2006), many studies have pointed out that the contribution of emotional
information is rather limited. For instance, the decision-making impairments of VMPFC
patients on the IGT can be explained by cognitive deficits (e.g., reversal learning) rather than
by any inability to generate emotional or somatic markers (Maia & McClelland, 2005). When
the reversal learning component is removed, VMPFC patients’ performance on the IGT is
comparable to that of normal controls (Fellows & Farah, 2005). The results of our
experiments are in agreement with a range of studies in the decision-making literature
regarding the importance of conscious knowledge (for a comprehensive review see Newell &
Shanks, 2014). When appropriate and sensitive measures of awareness are employed,
evidence of unconscious processes is surprisingly weak.
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Computational models of the IGT assume different kinds of factors such as cognitive,
motivational, and response processes (e.g., Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). Hence, future research
could try to decompose these processes/mechanisms and ascertain their contribution when
participants make decisions. It is possible that wagering is more sensitive to the emotional/
motivational components of decision-making and thus a poor indicator of the acquisition of
conscious knowledge. Moreover, Pasquali, Timmermans, and Cleeremans (2010) argued that
advantageous wagering can be acquired in the absence of awareness which would make it an
unsuitable measure of awareness in the IGT (see also Dienes & Seth, 2010). This could
explain the results shown in Figure 9, namely that explicit questioning (i.e., which of the four
cards would you pick until the end of the task?) can elicit higher levels of awareness than
wagering.
Decision-making in the IGT
The IGT has been widely employed as a standard tool for studying decision-making
in clinical populations and also as a task to measure decision-making under uncertainty in
healthy participants. However, there is no consensus in the vast IGT literature regarding the
features of the decks that are most important in shaping decision-making strategies. Initially,
Bechara et al. (1994) suggested that normal participants begin to consistently select good
decks after an exploration phase. The driving force for this selection pattern is the overall
expected values associated with each deck. Decks with a positive total outcome are selected
more often compared to ones with a negative outcome, regardless of other confounding
factors such as the probability and magnitude of losses. The crucial assumption is that normal
participants will always learn the advantageous strategy in a canonical and predictive manner.
However, many of the early assumptions about the IGT have been questioned in light
of recent experimental evidence. Steingroever et al. (2013) conducted a literature review on
IGT studies and concluded that the major assumptions relating to decision-making in healthy
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participants are essentially invalid. Specifically, there is often no clear preference for good
over bad decks, choice behavior across decks is not uniform, and the usual exploration-
exploitation trade-off is rarely observed. Instead people seem to prefer the decks with
infrequent losses (decks B and D) with no explicit tendency to exploit the most rewarding
options. Similarly, Horstmann, Villringer, and Neumann (2012) concluded that the factors
that influence performance in the IGT (in descending order of importance) are: gain
frequency, loss frequency, and overall expected value. The results from the present
experiments are broadly in line with these findings. In the experiments that used the standard
IGT payoff schedule, participants’ choices were predominantly guided by loss frequency, and
deck D was selected more often than any other deck. The interesting finding is that deck B,
which is a disadvantageous deck, was selected as often as deck C, even though the latter has a
positive expected value, and in some cases was selected as often as deck D (see Experiment
3). In fact, a clear preference for the good decks was only observed in Experiment 1, where
participants selected decks C and D more often than decks A and B.
Our results also show that participants can be sensitive to differences among the decks
regarding their overall expected value. In Experiment 4A, the most profitable deck (deck C)
was favored and there was no overall difference between the decks with a negative total
outcome. The key finding of this experiment was that participants were able to grasp the
payoff structure very early in the task, which suggests that difficulties participants experience
in the classic IGT may be associated with its idiosyncrasies. First, when participants
encounter the initial loss in deck B on trial 9, they may think of it as a rare event and keep
selecting cards from this deck. Secondly, the concurrent presentation of wins and losses
might make it harder to acquire the optimal strategy. Thirdly, it has been shown that 100
trials are not sufficient for participants to learn and exploit the advantageous decks (Fernie &
Tunney, 2008; Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers, 2010).
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We have suggested that loss aversion may be an important concept for understanding
wagering behavior in the experiments reported here. For example, one reason why wagering
may underestimate awareness compared to verbal reports (Figure 9) is that participants may
simply be averse to the large losses that can follow high wagers. Although it means foregoing
large gains, wagering low minimizes the likelihood of large losses, even when one has some
confidence about which are the good decks. We did not directly measure participants’ degree
of loss aversion and acknowledge that employing it as an explanatory concept is speculative.
Further research in which loss aversion and IGT wagering are separately measured will be
valuable.
Variation between and within studies. Yet another problematic aspect of the IGT is
that participants do not exploit the most profitable decks but instead go back to select cards
from the disadvantageous decks, especially deck B. Specifically, most IGT studies report
only a weak overall preference for the good decks, between 50% and 60% (Steingroever et
al., 2013), with continued sampling from deck B. The results from our experiments, where
we employed a payoff structure similar or identical to the original IGT, are in reasonable
accordance with these percentages (Experiment 1 = 66%, Experiment 2 = 62.2%, Experiment
3 = 55%, Experiment 4B = 60%; weighted mean across experiments 58.7%). However, in the
experiments reported here, we assessed awareness concurrently (wagering, confidence
ratings, and questionnaire) with decision-making and this may have had an effect on deck-
selections, making participants more attentive to the deck payoffs. For instance, participants
may focus more on the task knowing that they will have to answer specific questions about
the decks. Similarly, Cella, Dymond, Cooper, and Turnbull (2012) argued that the systematic
assessment of participants’ awareness may facilitate performance on the IGT.
The same also applies to wagering as the tendency to maximize winnings can increase
participants’ motivation to perform well in the task (Sandberg et al., 2010). In fact,
AWARENESS IN DECISION-MAKING 51
Szczepanowski et al. (2013) found that performance on a cognitive task (detection of fearful
faces) was increased when post-decision wagering was simultaneously used as a probe of
conscious knowledge, suggesting that financial incentives can motivate participants to
perform better on the primary task. Another aspect of using post-decision wagering is the
magnitude change in payoffs, as wagers in our tasks were employed as multipliers of the
actual deck payoffs. Better ability to discriminate between good and bad decks has also been
observed in other IGT studies in which participants’ awareness was assessed at the same time
as their decision-making performance (see Dymond, Bailey, Willner, & Parry, 2010; Evans et
al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Persaud et al., 2007; Wagar & Dixon, 2006).
Concluding remarks and limitations
In the experiments reported here, we obtained results at odds with the predictions of
the somatic marker hypothesis regarding the activation of an unconscious emotional system,
which is assumed to provide information about the outcome of the decision-making process.
Decision strategies in the IGT rely almost exclusively on acquired conscious knowledge
about the properties of the decks. The second major point of the present article is that caution
is advised when drawing conclusions about the existence of implicit influences in decision-
making under uncertainty when unsuitable methods of measuring awareness are used.
Persaud et al.’s (2007) conclusions seem ungrounded because of the pronounced failure of
post-decision wagering to measure awareness with adequate sensitivity. We have shown that
wagering underestimates awareness by comparison to other methods, and that wagering
strategies are affected by the design of the pay-off matrix.
The overall utility of post-decision wagering as a reliable measure of awareness needs
to be further examined under different settings (e.g., different pay-off matrices, no-loss
gambling in order to remove the effect of loss aversion) and other experimental conditions, as
it seems to be unsuitable in a context (the IGT) where the first-order task also involves
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gambling. The results and conclusions of the current article only extend to the IGT and
further evaluations of post-decision wagering are needed using different behavioral tasks or
populations. For instance, Persaud et al. (2007) reported a dissociation between awareness (as
measured by wagering) and behavior in three different tasks: artificial grammar learning,
blindsight, and the IGT. However, our findings are consistent with other studies which have
shown that wagering is no more reliable or exhaustive than confidence ratings (e.g., Dienes &
Seth, 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Wierzchon et al., 2012). In a recent re-analysis of
Szczepanowski et al.’s (2013) study which compared three subjective measures of awareness
(post-decision wagering, confidence ratings, and perceptual awareness scale [PAS] ratings),
Sandberg, Bibby, and Overgaard (2013) found that confidence and PAS ratings were
significantly more sensitive than post-decision wagering. If we are to measure awareness as
accurately and sensitively as possible, the results from different methods should be combined
in order to provide a finer and deeper examination of claims involving implicit or
unconscious influences.
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Footnote
1 We ran a further group of participants (N=20) under conditions identical to the control group
of Experiment 1 in order to check whether the pattern of results was reproducible. There was
again no evidence for a dissociation between deck selection and wagering: both measures
became reliably better than chance on block 6, somewhat later than in the control group of
Experiment 1 (block 4). The percentage of good deck selections across blocks was 59.3%
(A=.13, B=.28, C=.28, D=.31), indicating a weaker learning effect compared to the control
group of Experiment 1 (63.8%).
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Table 1
Pay-off matrices for the different combinations of deck selection and wager
Persaud et al. Clifford et al.
Deck Selection
Wager Good Bad Good Bad
Low +1 -1 +2 -1
High +2 -2 +5 -5
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Table 2
Outline of the Experiments
Note. QQ = Quantitative questioning, NQ = No questioning, SW = Simple wagering, MW = Modified wagering, P = Persaud et al.
(2007), C = Clifford et al. (2008), IGT = original Iowa Gambling Task, Prob = probabilistic, H = High, L = Low, qst = Maia and
McClelland’s questionnaire, CR = Confidence ratings.
Experiment
Persaud et
al. study 1 2 3 4A 4B
QQ NQ SW MW
Payoff matrix P P P P C P C C
Reward/Punishment
Schedule P P P IGT IGT IGT Prob IGT
Wagers 10/20 10/20 10/20 1/2 H/L 1/2 H/L H/L
Reward/Punishment Separated Separated Separated Separated Separated Separated Combined Separated
Performance-related
remuneration        
Other Measures qst qst    CR qst qst
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Table 3
Mean ratings and proportion of selections for each deck in Experiment 1
Proportion of Selections
Deck
Mean Ratings
(SD)
Questionnaire
Group
Control
Group
A -3.01 (3.69) 0.12 0.12
B -2.71 (4.86) 0.20 0.24
C 0.67 (3.37) 0.33 0.30
D 2.17 (3.33) 0.34 0.34
Note. The mean ratings come from the questionnaire group.
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Table 4
Mean ratings and proportion of selections for each deck in Experiment 4
Experiment 4A Experiment 4B
Deck
Mean Rating
(SD)
Proportion of
Selections
Mean Rating
(SD)
Proportion of
Selections
A -5.32 (3.61) 0.09 -2.46 (4.39) 0.15
B -2.94 (4.40) 0.11 -1.47 (5.51) 0.25
C 5.60 (2.98) 0.42 1.58 (3.39) 0.25
D 4.31 (3.29) 0.38 3.52 (4.06) 0.35
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Appendix A
Reward and Punishment Schedule of the IGT (Experiment 1)
Note. The payoff schedule was constructed based on the ratio of loss to win of the original IGT. For example, in the original task deck A has a
50% probability of loss. The wins are always £100 and the losses range from £150 to £350. On trial 3 there is a loss of £150. The ratio of loss to
win is 1.5. Since the coefficient of win is always 2 in Persaud et al.’s (2007) variation, we multiplied each ratio by 2. This gives us the schedule of
the losses. The average wager is (20 + 10) / 2 = 15. For example, for the first 10 trials on deck A the losses are (3 + 6 + 4 + 5 + 7) × 15 = 375 and
the wins are (2 × 10) × 15 = 300. The difference is five times the average wager per ten cards [5 × 15 = 75]. We applied this procedure on the
remaining decks. The payoff schedule is repeated twice for the 100 trials of the task.
Trial /
Deck
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
A(+2) -3 -6 -4 -5 -7 -7 -5 -4 -6 -3 -6 -7
B(+2) -25 -25 -25
C(+1) -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -0.5 -1.5 -0.5 -1.5 -1 -1 -0.5
D(+1) -5 -5
Trial /
Deck
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
A(+2) -4 -5 -3 -7 -4 -5 -3 -6 -5 -7 -6 -3 -4
B(+2) -25 -25
C(+1) -1 1.5 -1 -0.5 -0.5 -1.5 -1 -1.5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
D(+1) -5 -5 -5
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
1. Please rate, on a scale from -10 to +10, how good or bad you think deck A is, where -
10 means that it is very bad and +10 means that it is very good.
2. Okay, now suppose that you were to select 10 cards from deck A.
2.1. What would you expect your average result to be?
2.2. For those trials in which you would get a win, what would you expect your
average winning amount to be?
2.3. In how many of the 10 trials would you expect to get a loss?
2.4. For those trials in which you would get a loss, what would you expect the
average loss to be?
3. Now suppose I told you that you could only select cards from one of the decks until
the end of the game, but that you were allowed to choose now the deck from which
you would draw your cards. Which of the four decks would you pick?
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials for the control (A) and questionnaire groups (B) in Experiment 1 (lines). The grey
diamond and the triangle markers represent the proportion of participants who gave higher
rating to one of the two best decks and the proportion of participants who selected one of the
two best decks as their choice if they were allowed to select only one deck. The star and the
square markers represent the proportion of participants who gave the highest reported
expected net and the calculated net to one of the two best decks. Points are offset horizontally
so that error bars (± 1 SEM) are visible.
Figure 2. Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in the simple wagering (A) and modified wagering groups (B) in Experiment 2. Points
are offset horizontally so that error bars (± 1 SEM) are visible. (C, D) Overall proportion of
deck selections.
Figure 3. Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials for each group in Experiment 3 (A-C). Points are offset horizontally so that error bars (±
1 SEM) are visible. (D-F) Overall proportion of deck selections in each group.
Figure 4. (A) Type 2 ROC curves for the blocks before (1-5) and after (6-10) the onset of
good deck selections. (B) Distribution of the area under the curve (A) when fitting the ROC
model to each participant (blocks 6-10).
Figure 5. (A) Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 4A (lines). The grey diamond and the triangle markers represent the
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proportion of participants who gave higher ratings to one of the two best decks and the
proportion of participants who selected one of the two best decks as their choice if they were
allowed to select only one deck. The star and the square markers represent the reported
expected net and the calculated net, respectively. (B) Overall proportions of deck selections.
The win probability associated with each deck is depicted on the top of each bar.
Figure 6. Percentage of participants who showed knowledge of the advantageous strategy in
the questionnaire items versus in their wagers in Experiment 4A. Wagering indicates the
percentage of participants who made an advantageous wager (high on a good deck choice) on
the trial immediately following the administration of the questionnaire.
Figure 7. (A) Proportion of good deck selections and advantageous wagering across blocks of
trials in Experiment 4B (lines). The grey diamond and the triangle markers represent the
proportion of participants who gave higher rating to one of the two best decks and the
proportion of participants who selected one of the two best decks as their choice if they were
allowed to select only one deck. The star and the square markers represent the reported
expected net and the calculated net, respectively. (B) Overall proportions of deck selections.
Figure 8. Percentage of participants who showed knowledge of the advantageous strategy in
the questionnaire items versus in their wagers in Experiment 4B. Wagering indicates the
percentage of participants who made an advantageous wager (high on a good deck choice) on
the trial immediately following the administration of the questionnaire.
Figure 9. Proportion of participants classified as aware and unaware of the advantageous
strategy on trial 20 by wagering and the deck-selected question across experiments. Wagering
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represents the proportion of participants whose average advantageous wagering on trials 16-
25 was equal to or greater than 0.50.
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